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INTRODUCTION 
On May 8, 2017, the Government of India instituted proceedings in 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or the “Court”) against the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan alleging violations of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”) in relation to Mr. 
Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, an Indian national, who was sentenced to 
death by a Pakistani military court.  This proceeding marks the fourth 
time that the two States have been on opposite sides at the ICJ, and this 
dispute has garnered considerable media attention in both States.1 
India’s case is that Jadhav was a retired naval officer who was 
kidnapped from Iran, brought to Pakistan, and tried on concocted 
charges of conducting espionage and terrorist activities on Pakistani 
                                                          
1.  The other three cases were: Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO 
Council (India v. Pak.), Judgment, 1972 I.C.J. 46 (Aug. 18) [hereinafter ICAO 
Council-Judgment]; Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), 1973 I.C.J. 
347 (Dec. 15); Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India), Jurisdiction of the 
Court, Judgment, 2000 I.C.J. 12 (Feb. 14). For instances of media coverage of the 
dispute in both countries, see, Jayanth Jacob, Kulbhushan Jadhav’s Case in ICJ 
Today: How, What and Why of the India-Pakistan Tussle, HINDUSTAN TIMES (May 
15, 2017), http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/kulbhushan-jadhav-s-case-in-
icj-today-how-what-and-why-of-the-latest-india-pak-flashpoint/story-
0eKAIegrH9uT8IBaldjRnL.html; Taimur Malik, “Pakistan Didn’t Fail”: 5 Things 
You Should Know About ICJ’s Decision on Jadhav, DAW (May 19, 2017), 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1334111/pakistan-didnt-fail-5-things-you-should-
know-about-icjs-decision-on-jadhav. 
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soil.2  Conversely, Pakistan’s version of the dispute is that Jadhav was 
a spy sent by India to conduct subversive activities on Pakistani 
territory, and after his arrest, he voluntarily confessed to his 
involvement in espionage and terrorism in Pakistan.3  While differences 
persist in the circumstances surrounding Jadhav’s arrest between the 
two States, India’s application to the ICJ alleged Pakistan violated the 
VCCR.  Specifically, India alleged Pakistan denied Jadhav access to the 
Indian consular post, and correspondingly, denied Indian authorities 
any communication or contact with Jadhav from the time of his arrest 
through the course of the trial.  In response to India’s application to 
grant provisional measures, the ICJ issued an order on May 18, 2017, 
asking Pakistan to ensure that Jadhav is not executed before the final 
decision of the Court.  In a subsequent order dated June 13, 2017, the 
Court fixed the time limits for the filing of written pleadings by both 
States.4 
This dispute raises interesting questions of international law, inter 
alia, relating to interpretation of the VCCR, the right to a fair trial under 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”), the remedies the Court can grant, and procedural issues 
relating to the Court’s jurisdiction and admissibility of claims.  In this 
Article, the authors attempt to address some of the principle legal issues 
raised by the dispute.  Since the final written submissions of the two 
parties have not been filed at the time of writing this Article, the authors 
have largely relied upon the oral submissions made by the parties at the 
provisional measures hearing before the Court in order to ascertain their 
legal positions. 
Using the existing legal framework and the Court’s precedents, the 
authors examine the tenability of the submissions and how likely they 
are to find favor with the Court.  Part I of this Article deals with the 
                                                          
2.  Jadhav Case (India v. Pak.), 2017 I.C.J. 168, Verbatim Record, ¶ 94 (May 
15, 2017, 10 a.m.), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/168/168-20170515-ORA-
01-00-BI.pdf [hereinafter Oral Submissions-India]. 
3.  Jadhav Case (India v. Pak.), 2017 I.C.J. 168, Verbatim Record, ¶ 8 (May 15, 
2017, 3 p.m.), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/168/168-20170515-ORA-02-
00-BI.pdf [hereinafter Oral Submissions-Pakistan]. 
4.  India must file its memorial by September 13, 2017, and Pakistan must file 
its counter memorial by December 13, 2017.  See Jadhav Case (India v. Pak.), Order, 
2017 I.C.J. 168 (June 13), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/168/168-
20170613-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf.  
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provisional measures passed by the Court, their relationship to the 
merits of the dispute, and issues regarding enforcing compliance with 
this order of the Court.  Part II deals with the Court’s jurisdiction in this 
dispute, and specifically addresses Pakistan’s preliminary objections.  
Part III deals with the issue of admissibility of India’s claims before the 
Court, in light of the necessity for the exhaustion of local remedies in 
the courts of Pakistan prior to the application for diplomatic protection 
in the Court.  Part IV addresses India’s claims on the merits with respect 
to violations of VCCR and possible justifications Pakistan may 
advance.  Part V examines the relevance of a bilateral agreement, 
concerning consular access, which the two States entered into in 2008.  
Part VI addresses India’s claims under the ICCPR regarding Jadhav’s 
detention and trial.  Part VII touches upon the question of the remedies 
that the ICJ would likely grant even if it finds in favor of India’s 
submissions on merits.   
I. THE PROVISIONAL MEASURES ORDER 
A. Significance of the Order 
Article 41 of the ICJ Statute gives the Court the power to grant 
provisional measures in order to preserve the rights of either (or both5) 
parties to the dispute, pending its final decision.  This provision is 
substantively the same as Article 41 of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”), the ICJ’s predecessor.6  The 
question of whether provisional measures ordered by the Court were 
binding was one that scholars had debated for a long time;7 however, 
                                                          
5.  See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Provisional Measures, 1986 I.C.J. 3 
(Jan. 10). 
6.  The only two differences are minor: the word “reserve” has been replaced by 
the word “preserve” in relation to the respective rights of either party, and the word 
“Council” in paragraph 2 of Article 41 has been replaced by “Security Council”. 
7.  See JERZY SZTUCKI, INTERIM MEASURES IN THE HAGUE COURT: AN 
ATTEMPT AT SCRUTINY 280–93 (1983); Peter A. Bernhardt, The Provisional 
Measures Procedure of the International Court of Justice through U.S. Staff in 
Tehran: Fiat Iustitia, Pereat Curia?, 20(3) VA. J. INT’L L. 557 (1980).  For a 
comprehensive review of academic opinion on this issue, see Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bos. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 325, 370 (Sept. 13) 
(separate opinion by Weeramantry, J.).  
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the issue was put to rest by the ICJ in its decision in LaGrand.8  The 
Court held that the “object and purpose of the Statute, as well as the 
terms of Article 41 when read in their context,”9 made it clear that 
orders granting provisional measures were binding. 
On May 8, 2017, in Jadhav’s case, India submitted its request to the 
Court for indication of provisional measures, which sought an order 
enjoining Pakistan from executing Jadhav pending the Court’s final 
decision.  India was perhaps emboldened when the ICJ granted similar 
provisional measures in three cases involving questions of consular 
access: Breard,10 LaGrand11 and Avena.12  All three cases involved 
persons on death row in different states within the United States.  
Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico, respectively, had claimed a violation 
of the VCCR, in denial of consular access to these individuals, much 
like India’s present dispute with Pakistan. 
The ICJ conducted oral hearings on May 15, 2017, on the question 
of provisional measures, at which both India and Pakistan made 
submissions.  On May 18, 2017, the ICJ issued an order that accepted 
India’s request and granted provisional measures.  The order required 
Pakistan to “take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Mr. Jadhav 
is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings and shall 
inform the Court of all the measures taken in implementation of the 
present Order.”13  The order on provisional measures would not come 
as a surprise to many; given the similarities with Breard, LaGrand, and 
Avena, and the Court’s strong reluctance in departing from its previous 
jurisprudence.14  In fact, the provisional measures granted by the Court 
                                                          
8.  LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) [hereinafter 
LaGrand-Judgment].  
9.  Id. at 8 ¶ 102. 
10.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional 
Measures, 1998 I.C.J. 248, ¶ 41 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Breard]. 
11. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. 9, ¶ 29 (Mar. 3) 
[hereinafter LaGrand-Provisional Measures]. 
12. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 
2003 I.C.J. 77, ¶ 59 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Avena-Provisional Measures]. 
13.  Jadhav Case (India v. Pak.), Provisional Measures, ¶ 60 (May 18, 2017), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/168/168-20170518-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf 
[hereinafter Jadhav-Provisional Measures]. 
14.  The Court’s reluctance is best described in its decision on Preliminary 
Objections in the Land and Maritime Boundary case, where the Court noted, “It is 
true that, in accordance with Article 59, the Court’s judgments bind only the parties 
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are the same as those granted in Breard, LaGrand, and Avena.15  The 
Court used the conventional three-pronged rule, used in previous 
decisions under Article 41, in deciding whether provisional measures 
were appropriate.  The rule requires the ICJ to find (1) the existence of 
prima facie jurisdiction, (2) a link between the rights being protected 
and the measures requested, and (3) a risk of irreparable prejudice and 
urgency.16  Applying these criteria, the Court found that the 
requirements for granting provisional measures were met in this case. 
However, provisional measure orders are not a reliable indicator as 
to the way the Court may decide the dispute’s merits.  As the terms of 
Article 41 suggest, such actions are provisional and do not have any 
bearing on the decision on the merits of the case.17  Further, the Court’s 
decision to grant provisional measures is also not an affirmation of the 
Court’s jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute.  In Icelandic 
Fisheries,18 the Court noted, at the stage of Article 41, the applicant 
need only prove the possibility of a prima facie existence of 
jurisdiction.19  More than once, the Court has declined jurisdiction on 
the merits after having ordered provisional measures.20 
                                                          
to and in respect of a particular case. There can be no question of holding Nigeria to 
decisions reached by the Court in previous cases. The real question is whether, in this 
case, there is cause not to follow the reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases.”  Land 
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 
Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 275, ¶ 28 (June 11). 
15.  See Breard, supra note 10, at ¶ 41; LaGrand-Provisional Measures, supra 
note 11, ¶ 29; Avena-Provisional Measures, supra note 12, at ¶ 59. 
16.  See Passage through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), Provisional Measures, 
1991 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 14, 21–23 (July 29). 
17.  In provisional measure decisions, the Court, almost always, reaffirms the 
provisional character of its order and clarifies that it does not have any bearing on the 
question of merits.  See, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 
Provisional Measures Order, 2006 I.C.J. 113, ¶ 85 (July 13). “Whereas the decision 
given in the present proceedings in no way prejudges the question of the jurisdiction 
of the Court to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the 
admissibility of the Application, or relating to the merits themselves; and whereas it 
leaves unaffected the right of Argentina and of Uruguay to submit arguments in 
respect of those questions.”  Id. 
18.  See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Interim Protection Order, 1972 
I.C.J. Rep. 12 (Aug. 17).  
19.  Id. ¶ 15. 
20.  See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. Rep. 93, 
115 (July 22) [hereinafter Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.]; see also Application of the 
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The delayed denial of jurisdiction gives rise to a strange situation 
and raises the larger question regarding the legitimacy of the Court’s 
power to grant provisional measures in the first place.  If the Court 
ultimately reaches the conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over the 
merits, ostensibly the Respondent is bound by the provisional measures 
ordered by the Court, without actually having consented to the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  While undoubtedly, this would involve an incursion on the 
State’s sovereignty.21  Nonetheless, given the ICJ’s dispute resolution 
function and the interim character of such measures, proponents of 
Article 41 measures argue it is a necessary power for the Court to ensure 
that its decisions on merits are not rendered meaningless by the acts of 
either party to the dispute. 
With regard to the Court’s provisional measure in the Jadhav case, 
the Court clarified in the final paragraph of its decision that the present 
decision does not in any way prejudge the question of jurisdiction, 
admissibility, or the merits themselves.22  Moreover, the Court stated 
both parties remain at liberty to advance arguments on all those issues.23  
Considering this obvious caveat, it is clear that the May 18, 2017, 
provisional measures order can in no way be taken as an indication of 
which way the Court may ultimately decide on the merits. 
B. The Issue of Compliance with the Provisional Measures 
If media opinion is to be believed, the Pakistani Government 
appears to have indicated that it will not comply with the provisional 
measures order.24  In the aftermath of the ICJ’s verdict, Pakistan’s 
official statement was that it does not accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction in 
matters related to national security; it is not clear what the importance 
                                                          
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.C.J. 70, ¶ 187 (Apr. 1). 
21.  See U.N. Charter art. 2; S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
22.  Jadhav-Provisional Measures, supra note 13, ¶ 60. 
23.  Id. 
24.  See, e.g., Mohan Katarki, Kulbhushan Jadhav Verdict: UN Security Council 
May Not Push Pakistan to Comply with ICJ’s Order, HINDUSTAN TIMES (May 19, 
2017), http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/kulbhushan-jadhav-verdict-un-
security-council-may-not-push-pakistan-to-comply-with-icj-s-order/story-
SLpgIMxWHjvL1L3Hke03AM.html. 
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of this statement is, but would ostensibly mean that Pakistan does not 
consider itself bound by the provisional measures order.25 If Pakistan 
does disregard the ICJ’s order, the issue would be what India’s remedies 
are against Pakistan’s non-compliance.  However, since Article 41 
measures are binding in nature, if Pakistan does not comply with the 
ICJ’s order, the violation itself would be a separate ground for India to 
establish the international wrongfulness of Pakistan’s actions, in its 
arguments in the merits phase.26 
The more contentious issue is whether India would be able to 
approach the U.N. Security Council to enforce the ICJ’s provisional 
measure, in the event there is concrete evidence that Pakistan plans to 
execute Jadhav in blatant disregard of the Court’s order.  The issue of 
whether the Security Council possesses the authority to enforce the 
ICJ’s provisional measures has been subject to much discussion among 
scholars, with most arguing the Security Council has no power to 
enforce Article 41 orders.27  Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter provides: 
[I]f any party to a case [before the Court] fails to perform the 
obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the 
Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, 
which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide 
upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.28 
The question then becomes, whether an order granting provisional 
measures under Article 41 is a “judgment” within the meaning of 
Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter.  Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter 
rather unhelpfully uses the term “decision,”29 and so does Article 59 of 
                                                          
25.  Pakistan Govt Rejects ICJ’s Verdict on Jadhav as India Celebrates, THE 
QUINT (May 18, 2017), https://www.thequint.com/politics/2017/05/18/pakistan-
government-rejects-icj-verdict-on-kulbhushan-jadhav-execution. 
26.  LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8, ¶¶ 115–16. 
27.  See, e.g., Karin Oellers-Frahm, Commentary to Article 41, in THE STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 923–66 (Andreas 
Zimmerman et. al., eds., 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter Oellers-Frahm].  For a contrary 
view, see Attila Tanzi, Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International 
Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 539, 569–70 
(1995). 
28.  U.N. Charter art. 94 ¶ 2. 
29.  Id. art. 94 ¶ 1.  
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the Court’s Statute, which explains that the Court’s “decision” is 
binding only between the parties.30 
On the other hand, Article 94(2) uses the term “judgment.”  One 
commentator parsed the ambiguity by concluding that depending on 
which Article is used, a provisional measures order has a different 
effect.  Specifically, for the purpose of U.N. Charter Article 94(1) and 
Article 59 of the Court’s Statute, provisional measures are in fact 
“orders,” and essentially “decisions” of the Court, but are not 
“judgments” for the purpose of Article 94(2) of the Charter—which 
alone may be the subject of recourse to the U.N. Security Council.31  
The PCIJ took a similar view when commenting on the South-Eastern 
Greenland case.32  In the South-Eastern Greenland case, the PCIJ noted 
the provisional measures were in the form of an order because such 
“measures of protection [were] essentially provisional in character, 
whereas ‘judgments’ were final decisions.”33  Thus, there seems to be 
a distinction between the ICJ’s orders of provisional measures and 
judgments, with only the latter affording States the right of recourse to 
the Security Council under the U.N. Charter. 
There is only one example where a State approached the U.N. 
Security Council in response to a violation of a provisional measures 
ordered by the ICJ.  In Anglo Iranian Oil Company,34 the United 
Kingdom approached the Security Council complaining of the Iranian 
Government’s failure to comply with the ICJ’s provisional measures.35  
During the Security Council’s deliberations on this matter, States held 
divergent views.  Most States expressed discomfort at the possibility 
that ICJ provisional measures would have binding force, and that the 
Security Council could enforce such orders.36  Since Iran had 
                                                          
30.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (1945) 
[hereinafter ICJ-Statute]. 
31.  Oellers-Frahm, supra note 27, at 1071. 
32.  Permanent Court of International Justice, Ninth Annual Report, 171 (ser. 
A) No. 9 (June 15, 1933), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-
international-justice/serie_E/English/E_09_en.pdf.  
33.  Id.  
34.  See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., supra note 22. 
35.  See Sztucki, supra note 7, at 297; S.C.O.R., 6th year, Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 
1951, pp. 1-2.  
36.  See, e.g., the remarks of the representative of Ecuador. U.N. S.C.O.R. 6th 
year, 562 mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.562 (Oct. 17, 1951). 
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challenged the Court’s jurisdiction, the Security Council ultimately 
adopted the French proposal to postpone consideration of the matter 
until the ICJ had ruled on its own jurisdiction.37  Eventually, the ICJ 
found that it lacked jurisdiction on the merits, so the Security Council 
never resumed its deliberations on the matter and did not express a 
conclusive view as to whether Article 41 orders could be enforced by 
the Council.  Nonetheless, the Security Council has frequently adopted 
resolutions urging States to comply with provisional measures ordered 
by the ICJ.38  However, these resolutions must be contrasted with the 
Security Council’s “enforcement” function under Article 94(2) of the 
U.N. Charter.  Therefore, it seems to be clear that India will not be able 
to approach the Security Council even if it becomes clear that Pakistan 
will violate the ICJ’s provisional measures order. At best, the Security 
Council can pass a resolution urging compliance on the part of Pakistan, 
but seemingly, can do no more. 
II. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
A. Jurisdiction under Article 36(1) of the Court’s Statute 
The two most commonly used bases for establishing the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction are provided in the Court’s Statute Article 36.  First, Article 
36(1) provides the ICJ with jurisdiction over all matters that the State 
Parties specifically agree to as well as disputes regarding treaties whose 
compulsory clauses provide for the ICJ’s jurisdiction.39  Second, 
Article 36(2) grants jurisdiction in cases where States have made 
unilateral declarations recognizing the ICJ’s jurisdiction over certain 
categories of disputes that may arise with other States.40  Here, India 
relies on Article 36(1) because both India and Pakistan are parties to the 
VCCR’s Optional Protocol, which provides all disputes relating to the 
VCCR’s interpretation or application “shall lie within the compulsory 
                                                          
37.  U.N. S.C.O.R., 6th year, 565th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.565 (Oct. 19, 
1951).  
38.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 461, pmbl. ¶ 2 (Dec. 31, 1979); S.C. Res. 81, pmbl. ¶ 2 
(Apr. 16, 1993).  
39.  ICJ-Statute, supra note 38, art. 36(1). 
40.  Id. art. 36(2). 
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jurisdiction of the ICJ.”41  The Optional Protocol’s compulsory clause 
designates the ICJ as the forum for resolving such disputes; therefore, 
so long as India can establish that the present dispute relates to the 
VCCR’s “interpretation or application,” the ICJ will have jurisdiction 
over the matter.42 
In its oral arguments, Pakistan raised preliminary objections to the 
Court’s jurisdiction. Pakistan relied on both India’s reservations to the 
ICJ’s jurisdiction (i.e. excluding the Court’s jurisdiction in case of 
disputes with Commonwealth States and the multilateral treaties 
reservation) as well as its own reservation concerning the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction in matters involving national security.  Pakistan 
emphasized that because the Jadhav case raises questions of Pakistan’s 
national security, the Court’s jurisdiction was necessarily excluded.  
However, this argument is flawed, because both India and Pakistan’s 
reservations are in relation to the Court’s Statute Article 36(2) or 
compulsory jurisdiction.  These reservations are irrelevant for the 
purposes of Article 36(1), under which a State can rely on a treaty’s 
compulsory clause for the basis of the ICJ’s jurisdiction (i.e., the VCCR 
in the present case).43 
This assertion is bolstered by the ICJ’s conclusion in ICAO 
Council, where the Court held that once it found that it had jurisdiction 
under Article 36(1), the reservations to jurisdiction under Article 36(2) 
became irrelevant.44  In its provisional measures order, the Court clearly 
states, “[A]ny reservations contained in the declarations made by the 
Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute cannot impede the 
Court’s jurisdiction specially provided for in the Optional Protocol.”45  
While it is true that any finding of jurisdiction in the provisional 
measures order is necessarily prima facie, it seems quite clear that the 
law on this is settled—parties cannot invoke reservations to jurisdiction 
under Article 36(2), where compulsory clauses of treaties are 
concerned.  Therefore, for Pakistan to reassert this claim at the merits 
stage would be a strategic error. 
                                                          
41.  Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 
I, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (Mar. 19, 1967).  
42.  Id. 
43.  ICAO Council-Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 25. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Jadhav-Provisional Measures, supra note 13, ¶ 26. 
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Under VCCR Optional Protocol Article I, the next aspect that the 
Court must consider while evaluating whether it has jurisdiction is to 
determine whether there is a “dispute” between the parties that arises 
out of the VCCR’s “interpretation or application.”  As early as 1924, 
the PCIJ laid out the definition of a “dispute,” which has since been 
consistently cited in subsequent decisions, as “a disagreement on a 
point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two 
[parties].”46  Similarly, the ICJ has held that a dispute would be a 
situation in which the two sides held clearly opposite views concerning 
the question of the performance or non-performance of certain treaty 
obligations.47 
In its oral submissions, India contended that Pakistan’s denial of 
Jadhav’s consular access amounts to egregious violations of Article 36 
of the VCCR.48  In response, Pakistan posits that Article 36 of the 
VCCR does not apply in cases of persons guilty (or suspected) of 
conducting espionage or spying activities.49  Moreover, Pakistan argued 
Article 55 of the VCCR would also apply, and in cases of interference 
in the internal affairs of the receiving State, consular access under 
Article 36 could be denied.50  The two States’ divergent arguments 
clearly indicate the existence of a dispute or a disagreement relating to 
the VCCR’s interpretation, application, and performance of obligations 
under that treaty.  Accordingly, based on the existence of a dispute, the 
ICJ would have jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims under Optional 
Protocol Article I. 
B. Adjudicating Claims under other Treaties 
Assuming a dispute exists to which both India and Pakistan are 
State Parties, the ICJ has jurisdiction over the dispute by virtue of the 
                                                          
46.  Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), Judgment, 1924 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11 (Aug. 30). 
47.  Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 
Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 74 (Mar. 30); see also Application of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Judgment, 2011 I.C.J. 70, ¶¶ 26–38 (Apr. 1) (determining a “dispute” is any factual 
or legal contention between two or more States). 
48.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, at 36, ¶ 70. 
49.  Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, at 20. 
50.  Id. 
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VCCR’s Optional Protocol.  However, one must examine whether the 
Court in such a case would be restricted to adjudicating claims only 
under the VCCR (given that its jurisdiction is borne out of the VCCR 
and not under Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute) or if its authority 
would extend to deciding obligations under other treaties or under 
customary international law.  This would become particularly important 
in this case considering India’s oral arguments relied on specific 
provisions of the ICCPR,51 while Pakistan has advanced arguments 
based on a 2008 bilateral agreement governing consular access between 
India and Pakistan.52  Currently, there is nothing in the VCCR or the 
Optional Protocol that provides any guidance on the issue as to whether 
the ICJ can look at other relevant rules of international law while 
adjudicating a dispute under the VCCR. 
Some multilateral treaties expressly recognize the competence of 
the forum adjudicating disputes under those agreements to consider 
other relevant rules of international law while reaching its decision.  For 
instance, Article 293 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea provides: “A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this 
section shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law 
not incompatible with this Convention.”53  Since an analogous 
provision is absent in the VCCR, the question would then be whether 
the Court, in this case, can consider India’s claims under the ICCPR 
and Pakistan’s under the 2008 bilateral agreement.  The instinctive 
answer to this query is negative because the ICJ is rather circumspect 
about its jurisdiction (especially ratione materiae) and provides great 
deference to notions of State sovereignty and consent.  Thus, the ICJ 
would be mindful that its jurisdiction is borne out of a specific treaty 
and does not reach beyond the terms of the treaty itself.  Interestingly, 
however, the ICJ seems to have taken the opposite approach. 
For example, in Oil Platforms, while reaffirming its jurisdiction is 
conveyed by the 1955 Treaty between the parties, the ICJ nonetheless 
decided that it extends to determining the lawfulness of the conduct of 
the parties with reference to the U.N. Charter and customary 
                                                          
51.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, at 39, ¶ 86. 
52.  Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, at 22. 
53.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 293, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (emphasis added). 
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international law.54  Similar conclusions were reached by the Court in 
Pulp Mills55 and Bosnian Genocide.56  In both cases, despite 
recognizing that the ICJ’s jurisdiction derived from a specific treaty, the 
Court reaffirmed its ability to refer to other relevant rules of 
international law while judging the parties’ conduct.  Such an approach 
by the Court is justified given Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”),57 which mandates that 
interpretation of a treaty must take into account all relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.58  
Following that line of reasoning, the Court in Jadhav, while interpreting 
the VCCR’s provisions, would have the ability and obligation to take 
into account other relevant rules of international law applicable 
between the parties.59 
III. THE ISSUE OF ADMISSIBILITY 
Once the question of jurisdiction is settled, the next issue is the 
admissibility of India’s application before the ICJ.  In this case, India 
has made claims against Pakistan, for violations of its own direct rights 
as well as indirect injuries through the violation of Jadhav’s rights under 
the VCCR.60  Regarding the violations of India’s own rights, there 
would clearly be no issue of admissibility.  However, as to the alleged 
                                                          
54.  Oil Platforms (Islamic Rep. Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 42 
(Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil Platforms]. 
55.  Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 
¶¶ 204–05 (Apr. 20). 
56.  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bos. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 
43, ¶ 149 (Feb. 26). 
57.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
58.  This was in fact, the reasoning adopted by the Court in the Oil Platforms 
case. See Oil Platforms, supra note 54, ¶ 41. 
59.  Both India and Pakistan are parties to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) as well as the 2008 bilateral agreement. With respect 
to the 2008 bilateral agreement, both parties differ as to whether the treaty has any 
legal significance before the Court. Thus, the 2008 bilateral agreement as well as the 
ICCPR do constitute “relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.”  See supra text accompanying note 54.  
60.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, at ¶ 70. 
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violations of Jadhav’s rights under the VCCR, India would have an 
indirect right of standing (i.e. through exercising diplomatic 
protection).61 International law requires that two conditions be satisfied 
before a State can exercise diplomatic protection over an individual’s 
rights.  First, the individual must be a “national” of that State.62  Second, 
all local remedies must have been exhausted in the other State’s courts 
against whom the violations are being claimed.63 
Therefore, India must first prove that Jadhav is an Indian 
“national.” During the provisional measures hearing, neither the 
Applicant nor Respondent argued this question extensively.  India 
relied on a letter received from Pakistan for assistance in the 
investigation, in which Pakistan stated that a First Information Report 
had been registered against “an Indian national.”  India’s stance, 
therefore, was Jadhav’s nationality had never been in question.64  In 
response, Pakistan argued Jadhav’s nationality “has not actually been 
established by the Indian authorities.”65  Because the countries 
presented conflicting accounts, the ICJ must first decide whether 
Jadhav is actually an Indian national before affording diplomatic 
protection.  Proving Jadhav’s nationality should not be burdensome for 
India, considering that Pakistan itself had contacted India for assistance 
in investigation of Jadhav’s case.66  In fact, it would be difficult for 
Pakistan to explain why it would request India to assist in the 
investigation, unless it was clear that Jadhav was an Indian national. 
The issue of exhaustion of local remedies, however, would require 
more effort.  Usually, when bringing claims on behalf of a national, a 
State is required to exhaust local remedies in the domestic courts of the 
other State.  Here, India would need to exhaust all local remedies in 
                                                          
61. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Preliminary 
Objections, 2007 I.C.J. 582, ¶¶ 63–65 (May 24) [hereinafter Diallo-Preliminary 
Objections]. 
62.  The test of “nationality” test required for exercising diplomatic protection 
was elaborated in detail in the Nottebohm decision of the ICJ. Nottebohm (Liech. v. 
Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).  
63.  On the exhaustion of local remedies rule, see, Diallo-Preliminary 
Objections, supra note 61, ¶¶ 42–44. 
64.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶ 69. 
65.  Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, at 13. 
66.  This is clear from Pakistan’s own oral submissions. See Oral Submissions-
Pakistan, supra note 3, ¶ 11. 
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Pakistan’s courts before bringing the alleged violations of Jadhav’s 
rights to an international forum.  However, in addition to the violations 
of Jadhav’s rights under the VCCR, India has claimed violations of its 
own direct rights as a nation.  In such a situation, where a State claims 
both a violation of its own direct rights and those of its national, the 
local remedies rule does not apply.67  In Avena, the ICJ was faced with 
violations similar to India’s allegations and found that Article 36 of the 
VCCR created an interdependent regime of both the State and 
individual’s rights.68  The ICJ held that in such a situation of 
interdependent rights, Mexico’s claims with respect to its nationals 
would not invoke the local remedies rule.69  Therefore, India need not 
show that local remedies in Pakistan have been exhausted. 
The Court in LaGrand also held the exhaustion of local remedies 
would not be mandatory if the Respondent State itself has failed to 
inform the person concerned of his available remedies in accordance 
with the State’s obligations under international law.70  Thus, if India 
can establish that Pakistan has failed to inform Jadhav of the remedies 
available to him under domestic law (an obligation that could derive 
from either the VCCR or ICCPR), then there would be no need to 
exhaust local remedies. 
The situation would be somewhat different if the ICJ were to 
adjudicate India’s contentions based on a violation of the ICCPR with 
respect to Jadhav’s detention and trial.  In that case, India would be 
espousing rights solely belonging to Jadhav and not to the State itself.71  
For contending such violations, the Court should require India to 
demonstrate that local remedies have been exhausted in Pakistani 
courts.  Additionally, the question of burden of proof becomes relevant: 
                                                          
67.  Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 
Rep. 12, ¶ 40 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Avena-Judgment]. 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8, ¶ 60. 
71.  Being a human rights treaty, the ICCPR does not confer a direct right of 
standing on India. India would have an indirect right of standing, based on a violation 
of its national’s rights. Therefore, India would have to exercise its right of diplomatic 
protection over Jadhav for bringing claims under the ICCPR before the Court. On the 
question of standing of a State for claiming human rights violations of its nationals 
see, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 33–35 (Feb. 5). 
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is it India’s burden to show that all effective local remedies have been 
exhausted or is it Pakistan’s to prove that there is some remedy that 
India and Jadhav failed to exhaust?  Confronting this issue in 
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A., the ICJ noted that, “it was for Italy to show, 
as a matter of fact, the existence of a remedy which was open to the 
United States stockholders and which they failed to employ.”72  Thus, 
the ICJ will put the burden of proof on the party that raises the 
contention local remedies have not been exhausted; here, that would be 
Pakistan. 
In its oral submissions, India has contended that there exists no 
“effective” remedy available to Jadhav that is yet to be exhausted.73  
Relying on information available in the public domain, India argues that 
Jadhav’s appeal would be heard by a military tribunal presided over by 
a two-star general, whereas his death sentence stood confirmed already 
by the Chief of Pakistan’s army staff, a four-star general.74  India asserts 
the mechanism of appeal available to Jadhav is ineffective since there 
is no realistic possibility of his conviction being overturned in appellate 
proceedings.75  India relied on public reports in the media to contend 
that Jadhav would not even have access to legal representation of his 
own choice.76  India further argued the availability of clemency as a 
right to Jadhav, would also be equally ineffective as a remedial 
measure.77  These arguments considered cumulatively convey India’s 
opinion that all available and effective local remedies have been 
exhausted and no limitation remains as to the admissibility of its claims. 
The rule requiring exhaustion of local remedies does have 
exceptions that are found in Article 15 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
                                                          
72.  Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15, ¶ 
62 (July 20).  
73.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶¶ 27, 93. 
74.  Id. ¶ 93. 
75.  Id.  
76.  India contended that according to reports in the Pakistani media, the 
“Lahore High Court Bar Association had threatened to cancel the membership of any 
lawyer pursuing Jadhav’s appeal against his conviction.” See Oral Submissions-India, 
supra note 2, ¶ 93. 
77.  Id. ¶ 28. 
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Diplomatic Protection.78  One of the exceptions is when there are no 
“reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress or the 
local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such redress.”79  In 
its commentary to Article 15, the ILC explains that the efficacy of local 
remedies is a question that “must be determined in the context of the 
local law and the prevailing circumstances” in that country.80  
Therefore, whether the appellate mechanism in Pakistan’s military 
court would, in fact, be an effective remedy that must be exhausted, 
would be a question India (and Pakistan) would have to answer by 
referencing the domestic law and the current circumstances in Pakistan. 
However, the issue of exhausting clemency proceedings is clearer.  
In its commentary to Article 14 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection, the ILC explains the injured alien is not required to exhaust 
remedies that involve approaching the executive for relief in the 
exercise of its discretionary powers.81  Thus, local remedies do not 
include remedies of “grace”82 or those whose “purpose is to obtain a 
favour and not to vindicate a right.”83  The ILC puts requests for 
clemency in this category of remedies that need not be exhausted before 
bringing an international claim. 
                                                          
78.  Draft Articles on Diplomatic Prot. with Comm’n, Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. 
on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, art. 15 (2006) 
[hereinafter ILC Draft Articles]. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. art. 15(a).  
81.  For a definition of “local remedies,” see id. art 14., cmt. 5.  
82.  The ILC’s Commentary to Article 14 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection cites the Finnish Shipowners Arbitration for this proposition.  See Claim 
of Finnish Shipowners (Fin. v. Gr. Brit.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1479, 1492 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1934).  
83.  The ILC’s Commentary to Article 14 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection cites De Becker to support this proposition.  De Becker v. Belg., App. No. 
214/56, 1962 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 214, 238 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).  
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IV. VIOLATIONS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON  
CONSULAR RELATIONS 
A. Denial of Consular Access 
In its oral submissions, India has primarily argued a violation of 
Article 36 of the VCCR.84  Article 36 deals with communication with 
the nationals of the sending State, in the receiving State.85  Article 
36(1)(a) contains the general rule that consular officers shall be free to 
communicate with and have access to nationals of the sending State.86  
Correspondingly, nationals of the sending State have the same freedom 
of communication with respect to the sending State’s consular staff.87  
Article 36(1)(b) ratifies a detainee’s right to communicate with his 
consular post in the event of arrest or detention by the authorities in the 
receiving State.88  In such a situation, if the national requests, the 
receiving State’s authorities shall, without delay, inform the consular 
post of the sending State of the person’s arrest or detention.89  The 
receiving State’s authorities are also obliged to expeditiously inform the 
person of his rights under this provision.90  Likewise, Article 36(1)(c) 
ratifies the rights of the consular staff in relation to a national who is 
detained or arrested.91  These rights include the right to visit, converse, 
correspond as well as arrange for legal representation for such 
national.92  Article 36(2) provides that the rights mentioned in Article 
36(1)(c) must be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations 
of the receiving State, subject to the caveat that such laws must 
necessarily enable full effect to be given to the rights under Article 36.93 
Article 36 of the VCCR was interpreted by the ICJ in LaGrand, 
where the Court held this provision establishes an “interrelated regime 
                                                          
84.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 1, 5, 15. 
85.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Mar. 19, 1967, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR]. 
86.  Id. art. 36(1)(a).  
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. art. 36(1)(b).  
89.  See id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. art. 36(1)(c). 
92.  Id.  
93.  Id. art. 36(2). 
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designed to facilitate the implementation of the system of consular 
protection.”94  The Court also noted that Article 36 created legally 
enforceable rights for the sending State as well as its nationals.95  In 
fact, in both LaGrand96 and Avena,97 the United States failed to inform 
detained foreign nationals of their rights under Article 36(1)(b) and 
denied them the opportunity of having their consular posts notified.  
The Court held in both cases, the United States’ actions, in effect, also 
violated obligations, under Article 36(1)(a) and (c), that it owed to the 
sending State (that is Germany and Mexico, respectively).98  In both 
cases, the Court found that given the interrelated regime of Article 36, 
once the receiving State failed to inform the detainee of his right to 
notify his consular post “without delay,” this would, in most cases, 
amount to a violation of the sending State’s right to have access to the 
individual, communicate with him, and arrange for his legal 
representation.99 
The facts in Jadhav stand on a slightly different footing. In 
LaGrand and Avena, the individuals concerned were not informed of 
their rights in time, and as a result, the national States were not aware 
of the individuals’ arrests.  However, because Jadhav continues to be 
held incommunicado, there is no way to ascertain whether he was 
informed of his rights under Article 36(1)(b) “without delay,”100 if 
Jadhav requested to have his consular post notified of his arrest, or if he 
attempted to address any communication to his consular post.101  If 
Jadhav did request to notify his consular post, Pakistan was obligated 
                                                          
94.  LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8, ¶ 74.  
95.  See id. ¶ 77. 
96.  Id. ¶ 73.  
97. Avena-Judgment, supra note 63, ¶¶ 102–03. 
98.  Id.; LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8, ¶ 73. 
99.  In Avena, the Court noted one of the Mexican nationals declined to have his 
consular post notified even after being informed of his rights under Article 36(1)(b) 
of the VCCR. In that person’s case, the Court noted that there would be no violation 
of either Article 36 (1)(a) or Article 36 (1)(c).  See Avena-Judgment, supra note 67, ¶ 
101.   
100.  Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, ¶ 3. 
101.  Id. Pakistan in its oral submissions did not deny that Jadhav was being 
kept incommunicado. Id. In most situations it would be unlikely for an individual who 
has been told of his rights to have his consular post informed to decline exercising 
those rights.  However, see footnote 91 for the exception discussed in Avena. 
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to inform the Indian consular post “without delay” of his arrest.  Jadhav 
was allegedly arrested on March 3, 2016, and India claims to have 
received information about the arrest on March 25, 2016.102  If both 
dates are correct, twenty-two days passed from the time Jadhav was 
arrested to when India received information about the arrest. 
Naturally, the actual meaning of the term “without delay” must be 
scrutinized.  The Court confronted the interpretation of the term 
“without delay” in Avena. Considering the framework of the VCCR’s 
terms, and the VCCR’s object and purpose, the Court rejected Mexico’s 
submission that the term “without delay” was to be understood as 
“immediately upon arrest and before interrogation.”103  The Court held 
that the term “without delay” did not necessarily mean that upon arrest 
an individual must be immediately informed of his rights under Article 
36(1)(b).104  However, the Court noted that the term implied a duty 
upon the authorities of the receiving State to inform the arrested 
individual of his rights under the VCCR, as soon as it was realized or 
there were grounds to believe that the individual was a foreign 
national.105 
Here, it appears Pakistan knew of Jadhav’s status as a foreign 
national at the time of his arrest.106  Relying on Avena, India could argue 
the twenty-two-day delay violated Pakistan’s obligation under Article 
36(1)(b) of the VCCR.  However, there is some indication in the 
travaux preparatoires of the VCCR that member States shared the 
opinion that some delay in informing the consular post was permissible, 
in instances where there are national security concerns.107  In fact, this 
seems to be one of the reasons for not adopting the English proposal of 
a forty-eight-hour time limit to inform the consular post of an arrest.108  
Considering Pakistan consistently maintains the security risks 
associated with Jadhav’s case,109 it may be possible for Pakistan to 
                                                          
102.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶ 68. 
103.  Avena-Judgment, supra note 67, ¶ 85. 
104.  Id. ¶ 87. 
105.  Id. ¶ 88. 
106.  See Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, ¶¶ 8–9. 
107.  See U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Summary Records of Plenary 
Meetings and of the Meetings of the First and Second Committees 338, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.25/6 (Vol. I) (Mar. 15, 1963) [hereinafter VCCR-Travaux].   
108.  Id. 
109.  See Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, 18–20. 
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contend the delay of about twenty-two days was justified under the 
VCCR. 
With respect to Article 36(1)(a) and (c) the violations seem more 
evident.  Pakistan has denied the Indian consular post communication 
and the right to arrange for Jadhav’s legal representation.110  In fact, 
India claims that Jadhav continues to be held incommunicado.111  
Interestingly, Pakistan does not refute India’s contention on facts—it 
does not claim to have informed Jadhav of his rights under the VCCR 
or to have provided the Indian consular staff access to Jadhav.  
Pakistan’s position is that the issue of consular access to Jadhav remains 
under evaluation.112  While Pakistan vehemently denies India’s 
allegation that Jadhav’s consular access is conditioned upon India’s 
assistance in the investigation against him,113 Pakistan has significantly 
emphasized India’s non-cooperation in the investigation in its oral 
arguments.114  Pakistan’s argument then, begs the question of whether 
under the VCCR, consular access can be denied if the State of the 
foreign national refuses to cooperate in the receiving State’s 
investigation against him. 
The text of Article 36 (or indeed any other Article of the VCCR) 
does not seem to indicate the existence of any such exception.  Turning 
to the travaux in the hopes of finding a basis for such an exception 
proves to be problematic.  From the moment of its conception, Article 
36 was one of the most controversial provisions, with States taking 
diametrically opposite views on its scope and content.115  In fact, the 
Soviet representative suggested that the unlikelihood of finding a 
satisfactory middle ground for the content of Article 36 warranted 
dropping such a provision altogether.116  However, the Indian delegate 
insisted that a Convention on consular relations could not be concluded 
                                                          
110.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶ 81. 
111.  Id. ¶ 91. 
112.  Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, 23. 
113.  Id. at 14. 
114.  Id. 
115.  See generally VCCR-Travaux, supra note 107.  (Consideration of the draft 
articles on consular relations adopted by the International Law Commission at its 
Thirteenth Session, A/CONF.25/6, Article 36). 
116.  Id. at 81. 
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without the inclusion of a provision as important as one governing the 
issue of consular access.117 
After lengthy debate, the Conference eventually accepted the text 
of Article 36.  While States did adopt divergent views on the text of 
Article 36, there was an overwhelming consensus about the importance 
of consular access for nationals of the sending State detained or 
imprisoned in the receiving State, during the drafting of the VCCR.118  
There is no evidence or indication that States believed that consular 
access could be restricted if the sending State did not cooperate in 
investigations with the receiving State.119  In fact, there is evidence to 
the contrary.  In an earlier draft, Article 36 (1)(a) provided that consular 
officials would, “in appropriate cases,” have access to their nationals.120  
However, States decided to drop this term in the final draft in order to 
reaffirm the importance of unrestricted two-way communication 
between the consular staff of the sending State and its nationals.121  
Therefore, it is highly likely that Pakistan’s denial of consular access—
whether or not contingent on India’s assistance in the investigation—is 
a violation of Article 36 of the VCCR. 
In its oral submissions, Pakistan raised two defenses to its denial of 
consular access.  First, Article 36 of the VCCR was not intended to 
apply to persons conducting espionage activities.122  Second, in 
accordance with Article 55 of the VCCR, consular access need not be 
                                                          
117.  Id. 
118.  See VCCR-Travaux, supra note 107, at 37–40.  While Article 36 was 
heavily debated at the Conference, the debate was largely focused on the modalities 
and feasibility of compliance with the provisions of that Article. In fact, many States 
were of the view that while the rights under Article 36 were indisputably necessary, 
it would create practical problems in many countries that had a large population of 
foreign nationals or where distances were great or in federal States.  
119.  See VCCR-Travaux, supra note 107, at 338.  Even in cases of arrests made 
on security reasons, the debate was focused on the time-period within which consular 
access must be granted, and there seems to be no situation where States envisaged that 
consular access could be absolutely restricted. 
120.  U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Summary Records of Plenary 
Meetings and of Meetings of the First and Second Committees 24, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.25/16/Add.1 (Vol. II) (Apr. 1963). 
121.  VCCR-Travaux, supra note 107, at 333. 
122.  See Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, at 20. 
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provided in such cases.123  The following sections will examine whether 
these defenses would be tenable before the Court. 
B. Applicability of Article 36 to Persons Suspected of Conducting 
Espionage or Terrorism 
Pakistan argues that the VCCR was adopted to develop friendly 
relations between States and, therefore, protection to a person (such as 
Jadhav) who has allegedly committed acts of espionage and terrorism 
cannot be the intention of the Convention.124  However, this argument 
is misplaced considering the drafting history and the subsequent 
practice of States in relation to consular access. Further, the text of 
Article 36 does not indicate any exception on the grounds of national 
security (espionage or terrorism). In fact, the protection under this 
Article extends to a national detained in any other manner.125 
A plain reading of Article 36 of the VCCR in conjunction with 
Article 31 of the VCLT, indicates that the protections include security 
and preventive measures or even incommunicado detention on the 
grounds of threat to national security.126  Additionally, this 
interpretation of Article 36 is supported by the VCCR’s drafting 
history.  The VCCR was adopted in 1963, during the Cold War era, at 
a time when alleged State-directed espionage was commonplace.127  
Despite this Cold War climate, no State called for the restriction of 
consular access to individuals detained on the grounds of national 
security while drafting Article 36.  Moreover, no State subsequently 
submitted any reservation or any interpretative declaration to this 
Article at the time of signing the Convention, which would indicate the 
belief that Article 36 protections should be proscribed in cases of 
persons accused of conducting espionage or terrorism.128  Additionally, 
                                                          
123.  Id. at 20–21. 
124.  See id.  
125.  VCCR, supra note 85, art. 36(1)(b). 
126.  Mark Warren, Rendered Meaningless? Security Detentions and the 
Erosion of Consular Access Rights, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31 (2014). 
127.  LUKE T. LEE & JOHN QUIGLEY, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 49 (3d ed., 
2008); John Quigley, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: In Retrospect and 
Into the Future, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 2 (2014). 
128.  See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Declarations & 
Reservations, (Apr. 24, 1963), 
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during the drafting stage, States also raised concerns over the undue 
delay in granting consular access in cases of incommunicado 
detentions,129 clearly intending Article 36 to have a wide scope 
guaranteeing this right to all detainees. 
In addition to the travaux preparatoires, it was common State 
practice to grant consular access to persons suspected (or convicted) of 
espionage, both before and after the VCCR’s adoption.130  For example, 
in 1956, prior to the adoption of the VCCR, Egypt allowed Britain 
consular access to Mr. James Swinburn and three other British nationals 
who were accused of espionage.131  Similarly, in 2009, Iran detained 
three American citizens, Fattal, Shourd, and Bauer on charges of 
espionage and illegal entry into Iran.132  Despite these charges, they 
were granted consular access.133  Conversely, in 2011, Eritrea denied 
consular access to four British nationals accused of terrorism, sabotage, 
and espionage.134  This denial of consular access was met with severe 
opposition from the United Kingdom.135  Ultimately, the United 
Kingdom relied on Article 36 of the VCCR and managed to secure the 
release of the detainees through diplomatic intervention.136  
Additionally, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, a body 
established by the Commission of Human Rights to investigate 
                                                          
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20III/III-
6.en.pdf. 
129.  See Summary Records of the 534th Meeting, [1960] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 42, 46, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1960.  
130.  BISWANATH SEN, A DIPLOMAT’S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE 323 (1965). 
131.  Id. 
132.  Cindy Buys, Reflections on the 50th Anniversary of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 57, 63 (2014). 
133.  Amnesty International Again Demands that Iran Release Americans Jailed 
for Two Years Case of Two American Hikers Due to be Heard Again on Sunday, 
AMNESTY INT’L (July 29, 2011), https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-
releases/amnesty-international-again-demands-that-iran-release-americans-jailed-
for-two-years-case-of-two-american-hikers-due-to-be-heard-again-on-sunday/. 
134.  Warren, supra note 126, at 31; For background on the issue see, Aaron 
Masho, Eritrea Accuses Britons of Espionage, Terrorism, THOMSON REUTERS (June 
9, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eritrea-britain-detention-
idUSLNE75803L20110609. 
135.  Id.  
136.  Id.; see also Warren, supra note 126, at 31.  
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arbitrary detentions, found Venezuela to be in violation of its obligation 
under the VCCR when it denied consular access to Colombian nationals 
detained on charges of espionage.137 
It is instructive to consider the ICJ’s ruling in the Tehran Hostages 
Case on this count.138 In that case, the Court examined Iran’s violations 
of the VCCR in failing to attempt to prevent militants from detaining 
American officials in Tehran’s United States embassy and consulates 
in Tabriz and Shiraz.139  Although Iran did not appear before the Court, 
it sent a letter to the Court, alleging that the United States had been 
conducting espionage activities and illegally interfering in Iran’s 
internal affairs.140  Further, Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran’s religious leader, 
passed a decree releasing only detainees not accused of spying, while 
the others who Iran suspected of espionage did not “enjoy international 
diplomatic respect.”141  While the Court did not expressly address the 
issue of consular rights granted to persons detained on charges of 
espionage, it held Iran violated Article 36 of the VCCR.142  The Court 
also noted that even if the United States committed the alleged criminal 
activities of espionage, Iran had to take action within the ambit of the 
rights provided under the VCCR.143  Thus, it appears that the ICJ 
regarded Article 36 as a right granted to all detainees, including those 
charged with espionage and other similar crimes. 
Additionally, the practice of States has been in favor of providing 
consular access to detainees accused of terrorism.  For example, when 
the United States restricted consular access to terrorist suspects 
detained in Guantanamo Bay after the September 11th attack, many 
States including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, protested and 
considered the restriction to be a violation of Article 36 of the VCCR.144  
Similarly, Pakistan sought consular access for Pakistani students who 
                                                          
137.  Mr. Santiago Giraldo Florez v. Venez., Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Opinion No. 31/2010, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2010/31 (2010), 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/wgad/31-2010.html.  
138.  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 
Judgment, 1980 I.C.J 3 (May 24) [hereinafter Tehran Hostages].   
139.  See generally id.  
140.  Id. ¶¶ 82–83.  
141.  Id. ¶ 73. 
142.  Id. ¶ 67.  
143.  Id. ¶ 83.  
144.  Warren, supra note 126, at 31. 
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had been detained in the United Kingdom on charges of terrorism in 
2009.145  In light of the preceding information, any support for 
Pakistan’s argument of carving out an inherent exception in Article 36 
for denying consular access to Mr. Jadhav is tenuous at best. 
C. The Relationship Between Article 36 and Article 55 of the VCCR 
In support of its interpretation of Article 36, Pakistan argues Article 
55 of the VCCR excludes the application of the VCCR to acts of 
espionage.146  This argument also lacks merit. Article 55(1) of the 
VCCR imposes an obligation on the persons enjoying immunities and 
privileges under the VCCR to respect the laws of the receiving State by 
not interfering within the internal affairs of that State.147  Relying on 
Article 55, Pakistan contends that because espionage amounts to an 
interference in a State’s internal affairs, there is no basis for providing 
consular access to an individual accused of espionage.148  This 
argument is flawed on two counts. 
First, Article 55 prohibits persons enjoying immunities from 
interfering in the internal affairs of the State.  The prohibition is phrased 
as a duty to “respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State” 
owed by those “persons enjoying such privileges and immunities,” and 
is thus only applicable to the consular staff.149  Article 55 is silent on 
detained individuals.  Thus, Article 55 states that the only situation in 
which Pakistan could perhaps have claimed a violation of Article 55 
was if a member of the Indian consulate in Pakistan committed acts of 
espionage, which is clearly not the circumstance in Jadhav.150  Second, 
Article 55 does not prevent consulate members from protecting the 
interests of their nationals in the receiving State.151 Protection of human 
                                                          
145.  Tim Shipman, Pakistan Condemns Home Office Over Student Terror 
Arrests, MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1170661/Pakistan-condemns-Home-Office-student-terror-arrests.html.  
146.  Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, at 20.  
147.  VCCR, supra note 85, art. 55(1).  
148.  Id. at 21.  
149.  International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Consular Relations With 
Commentaries, [1961] 2 Y.B. Int’l Comm’n, 123 [hereinafter Commentary-Consular 
Relations]. 
150.  Such an event was discussed in Tehran Hostages, supra note 138, ¶ 84. 
151.  Commentary-Consular Relations, supra note 149, at 124.  
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rights is an international concern that does not lie exclusively within the 
scope of a State’s internal affairs.152  Accordingly, when a State 
exercises its right to seek consular access to its national or exercise 
diplomatic protection on his behalf, the action does not constitute an 
interference in the receiving State’s internal affairs.153 
In Regina v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, ex parte Ferhut Butt, the family member of a British national 
detained in Yemen for terrorism allegations requested intervention by 
the English Court of Appeal.154  Specifically, the family member 
wanted the English Court of Appeal to interfere with an adjudication in 
a Yemen court.155  The Court found that because the local remedies 
were not exhausted, direct intervention in the judicial process of another 
State would amount to a violation of Article 55 of the VCCR.156  In 
contrast, extending consular protection to the British national detained 
on charges of terrorism was found to be well within the rights of the 
United Kingdom and did not constitute an intervention in the other 
State’s internal affairs.157  It follows that even if Pakistan can establish 
that Jadhav did commit acts of espionage, India would still be within its 
rights to request consular access under the VCCR. 
D. Article 36 of the VCCR: A Fundamental Human Right? 
An issue that arises in context of Article 36 of the VCCR is whether 
apart from creating a legal right flowing from the treaty, it also 
enshrines a fundamental human right in the context of arrested 
individuals, a contention that was raised by Germany in LaGrand.158  
The LaGrand Court found that it was unnecessary to decide whether 
                                                          
152.  See SIR IVOR ROBERTS, SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 358 (6th ed., 
2009). 
153. Annemarieke Künzli, Exercising Diplomatic Protection: The Fine Line 
Between Litigation, Demarches and Consular Assistance, 66 ZAÖRV 333 (2006).  
154.  R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte 
Ferhut Butt, Court of Appeal 9 July 1999, 116 I.L.R. 607–22, as cited in EILEEN 
DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON 
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 380 (4th ed., 2016). 
155.  DENZA, supra note 154, at 380.  
156.  Id. 
157.  Id. 
158.  LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8, ¶ 78. 
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Article 36 had assumed the character of a human right, given that it had 
already concluded that the United States violated its obligations under 
that Article.159  However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR), in a 1999 advisory opinion, noted the right of consular 
notification was part of the due process guarantees enshrined in the 
ICCPR.160  The IACtHR also held that the lack of consular notice and 
access, in cases of capital punishment, also violate the individual’s right 
to life.161  Whether Article 36 of the VCCR is interpreted as a 
fundamental human right or merely an individual right under the 
Convention will likely not affect the decision of the ICJ on the merits.  
However, the IACtHR’s advisory opinion underscores the importance 
of consular access and the rights enshrined under Article 36, for both 
the national as well as the sending State. 
V. 2008 BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON CONSULAR ACCESS 
In oral submissions, Pakistan heavily relied on a 2008 agreement 
between the two States, governing consular access.162  The short, seven-
paragraph bilateral agreement establishes rules governing foreign 
nationals arrested, detained or imprisoned in the other State and 
provisions of reciprocal consular facilities.163  Pakistan emphasizes 
paragraph six of this agreement, which provides, “In case of arrest, 
detention or sentence made on political or security grounds, each side 
may examine the case on its merits.”164  Pakistan contends that since 
                                                          
159.  Id. 
160.  The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the 
Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) No. 16, ¶¶ 121–24 (1999) [hereinafter IACHR-Advisory Opinion]. 
161.  Id. ¶ 137. During the drafting of Article 36, States also took the view that 
the greater the punishment involved, the higher the necessity would be for adherence 
to norms of consular access, given the degree of infringement of personal freedoms 
of the foreign national. For an example of the statement of the USSR representative, 
see VCCR-Travaux, supra note 107, at 37. 
162.  Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, at 21. 
163.  The text of the entire treaty can be found in Annex 10 to India’s application 
instituting proceedings before the ICJ. See Jadhav Case (India v. Pak.), Application, 
Annex 10, (May 8, 2017), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/168/19422.pdf 
[hereinafter Application-India]. 
164.  Id. 
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Jadhav is facing espionage and terrorism charges,165 the interpretation 
of the security exception in this Agreement as allowing a denial of 
consular access is justified.  In the alternative, Pakistan submits that the 
claim is being evaluated on merits in accordance with the agreement.166  
India raised two grounds for disputing the applicability of this 
Agreement, in its oral submissions.  First, the Agreement was not 
registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of 
the U.N. Charter, and hence cannot be relied upon before the ICJ.167  
Second, pursuant to Article 73 of the VCCR, bilateral agreements 
between the parties cannot restrict the rights provided for in the 
VCCR.168 Both contentions merit detailed scrutiny. 
A. Registration of the Agreement 
Article 102 of the U.N. Charter requires that every treaty shall be 
registered with U.N. Secretariat, and no party shall be able to invoke 
any unregistered treaty before any organ of the United Nations.169  
Since the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,170 it 
follows no party to a case before the Court can rely on a treaty that is 
not registered with the United Nations.  However, Article 102 of the 
U.N. Charter appears to have been diluted by the organs of the United 
Nations, in post-Charter practice.  For example, the ICJ has recognized 
that an agreement that is not registered or registered late is nonetheless 
valid and binding.171  In another decision, the Court accepted 
jurisdiction based on a special agreement between the parties that had 
not been registered.172  In fact, a commentator concluded, based on 
survey on the practice of the U.N. Security Council and ICJ, both organs 
                                                          
165.  Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, at 21–23. 
166.  Id. at 14, 22. 
167.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶¶ 16, 66. 
168.  Id. ¶ 66. 
169.  U.N. Charter art. 102.  
170.  Id. art. 92. 
171.  Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 112, ¶ 29 (July 1). 
172.  Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Preliminary Objection, 1948 I.C.J. 15 (Mar. 
25).  For the decision on merits on the basis of the special agreement concluded 
between the parties see Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 
9).  See also ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 543 (2014). 
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have shown “little or no inclination to ascertain whether an agreement 
has been registered with the U.N. Secretariat before permitting it to be 
invoked in proceedings before them.”173  Therefore, States have been 
permitted to rely “on unregistered treaties on a number of occasions.”174 
Most instructive is that the obligation to register a treaty can be 
discharged by any party to the agreement and registration by one party, 
relieves all the other parties of this obligation.175  Moreover, neither 
Article 102 nor the Registration Regulations adopted by the General 
Assembly to give effect to Article 102 prescribe a time-period within 
which registration must be affected.  Regarding the absence of any 
designated period, another commentator inferred that a “failure to 
register can be cured in the course of proceedings before the ICJ, that 
is, even after the Court has been seized.”176  In short, the Court does not 
strictly apply the registration requirement, as evidenced by its 
historically relaxed approach to unregistered treaties.177 Therefore, the 
fact that the 2008 Agreement was not registered with the U.N. 
Secretariat will likely not be fatal to Pakistan’s arguments that rely on 
provisions of the Agreement.  In fact, registration is available to 
Pakistan even now, after the Court has begun adjudicating the dispute. 
B. Subsequent Agreements under Article 73 of the VCCR 
One of India’s counterarguments against Pakistan’s contentions 
contingent on the 2008 agreement is based on Article 73 of the 
VCCR.178  Article 73(1) of the VCCR addresses existing agreements 
between parties on the date of the ratification of the Convention. 179  
                                                          
173.  D.N. Hutchinson, The Significance of the Registration or Non-
Registration of an International Agreement in Determining Whether or Not it is a 
Treaty, 46(2) CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 257, 279 (1993).  
174.  Id. 
175. See G.A. Res. 97(1), Registration and Publication of Treaties and 
International Agreements: Regulations to Give Effect to Article 102 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, Article 1(3), Article 3(1) (Dec. 14, 1946) as modified by G.A. 
Res. 364 B (IV) (Dec. 1, 1949); G.A. Res. 482 (V) (Dec. 12, 1950) and G.A. Res. 
33/141 A (Dec. 18, 1978). 
176.  KOLB, supra note 172, at 543. 
177.  See JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 
(1996). 
178.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶ 66.  
179.  VCCR, supra note 85, art. 73(1). 
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This paragraph declares the VCCR’s provisions shall not affect 
agreements that pre-date the VCCR.180  Article 73(2) provides that the 
VCCR does not preclude States from entering into agreements 
“confirming or supplementing or extending or amplifying” the 
provisions of the Convention.181 Since the 2008 Agreement was entered 
into after the VCCR became effective, India contends that an agreement 
made subsequent to the ratification of the VCCR cannot restrict the 
rights provided in the VCCR.182 
The drafting history supports India’s interpretation and application 
of Article 73.  During the debates on Article 73,183 the Indian delegation 
proposed an amendment that following ratification of the VCCR, 
parties would remain free to enter into particular agreements that 
granted more rights than those prescribed by the Convention and 
prevent agreements that restricted or reversed those rights.184  
Limitations on the ability to proscribe rights available under the VCCR, 
it was suggested, were necessary to ensure that multilateral attempts at 
codifying international law on consular relations remained effective.185  
The question of the VCCR’s efficacy in light of the ability to proscribe 
rights caused States to agree to the amendment proposed by the Indian 
delegation.  As a result, bilateral agreements made subsequent to the 
VCCR’s ratification can only “confirm, supplement, extend or amplify” 
the provisions of the Convention and by implication, not restrict the 
rights available therein.186 Thus, even if the Court accepts the validity 
of the 2008 Agreement, Article 73 of the VCCR prevents the Court 
from interpreting the Agreement in any way that restricts the rights 
available to India and Jadhav under Article 36. 
C. Provisions of the 2008 Agreement 
With regard to Jadhav’s case, it is illuminating to examine the 
substantive provisions of the 2008 Agreement.  Paragraph 2 of the 
                                                          
180.  Id.  
181.  Id. art 73(2).  
182.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶ 66(d). 
183.  During the drafting process Article 73 was designated as Article 71. 
184.  VCCR-Travaux, supra note 107, at 233. 
185.  Id. at 233. 
186.  Id. at 240. 
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Agreement requires that “immediate” notification of any arrest or 
detention be provided to the respective High Commissions of each 
country.187  As noted earlier, one of India’s alleged violations is the 
twenty-two-day delay in notification of Jadhav’s arrest.188  Similarly, 
paragraph 4 obligates both governments to provide consular access 
within three months of arrest.189  Pakistan, admittedly, a year after 
Jadhav’s arrest, has yet to provide Jadhav with consular access or 
allowed the Indian consular post to communicate with him.190  Given 
its provisions and Pakistan’s failure to meet the obligation set forth 
therein, it appears that Pakistan’s actions violate the 2008 Agreement. 
However, Pakistan relies heavily on the security exception in 
paragraph 6.  Unfortunately, Paragraph 6 is rather unhelpfully drafted 
and confuses more than it clarifies. The provision allows for arrests or 
detentions made on security (or political) grounds, stating that each side 
may examine the case on its merits.191  What remains unclear is the 
precise import of the term “examine the case on its merits.”  Paragraph 
6 does not explicitly state that it would supersede the obligations under 
paragraph 2 or paragraph 4.  One could argue that given its placement 
in the Agreement (that is after the obligations in paragraph 2 and 4), it 
would constitute the lex specialis in relation to arrests made on security 
grounds, and to that extent, would override the obligations under the 
rest of the Agreement.  This theory is just that, a theory; and paragraph 
6 remains ambiguous, as it does not stipulate any standard of conduct 
expected from either side or provide guidance as to how each State is 
supposed to act while examining “the case on merits.” 
Considering the ambiguity of paragraph 6, if read expansively, it 
could mean that for an arrest made on security grounds, either State 
would be correct in denying consular access on the pretext of examining 
the case on the merits. There is credibility, however, in the argument 
that the preamble of the Agreement would not admit of such an 
                                                          
187.  See Application-India, supra note 163.  
188.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶ 6. 
189.  See paragraph 4 of the 2008 Agreement.  Application-India, supra note 
163, Annex 10.   
190.  See Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5–6.  Pakistan does not deny 
the fact that it has not provided Jadhav consular access.  See also Oral Submissions-
Pakistan, supra note 3, at 14. 
191.  See paragraph 6 of the 2008 Agreement.  Application-India, supra note 
163, at Annex 10. 
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expansive interpretation to paragraph 6. In fact, the Agreement’s 
preamble memorializes both States’ intentions to further the objective 
of humane treatment of nationals of either country who were arrested, 
detained or imprisoned. Further, should the ICJ reconcile the agreement 
with Article 73 of the VCCR, it would likely attempt to interpret 
paragraph 6 of the Agreement in a manner that does not contradict the 
guarantees of consular access under Article 36. 
Thus, the Court, notwithstanding Pakistan’s reliance on paragraph 
6 of the 2008 Agreement, would likely find that such an excessive and 
undue delay in providing consular access to Jadhav, would be unlawful 
under the VCCR and the 2008 Agreement. 
VI. VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 
Pakistan is accusing Jadhav of espionage, terrorism, and other 
sabotage activities.192  Consequently, Jadhav has been charged and tried 
under Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923193 and Section 59 of 
the Pakistan Army Act, 1952.194  In response to Jadhav’s trial and 
conviction, India alleges Pakistan violated its obligations under the 
                                                          
192.  Application-India, supra note 163, Annex 2. 
193.  The Official Secrets Act, No. 19 of 1923 PAK. CODE [hereinafter Official 
Secrets Act].  Section 3,  reads:  
“Penalties for spying: (1) If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the 
safety or interests of the State: (a) approaches, inspects, passes over or is in 
the vicinity of, or enters, any prohibited place; or (b) makes any sketch, 
plan, model, or note which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to 
be, directly or indirectly, useful to an enemy; or (c) obtains, collects, records 
or publishes or communicates to any other person any secret official code 
or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article or note or other document 
or information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be, 
directly or in directly, useful to an enemy; he shall be guilty of an offence 
under this section . . . .”). 
194.  The Pakistan Army Act, No. 39 of 1952, PAK. CODE [hereinafter Pakistan 
Army Act].  Section 59, reads:  “Civil offences: (1) Subject to the provisions of 
subsection (2), any person subject to this Act who at any place in or beyond Pakistan 
commits any civil offence shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against this Act 
and, if charged therewith under this section, shall be liable to be dealt with under this 
Act.”). 
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ICCPR, which is binding on both States.195  In this regard, India has 
made three contentions.  First, Jadhav’s detention was unlawful as he 
was kept incommunicado.196  Second, the trial by Pakistan’s military 
court was in violation of Article 14 of the ICCPR, which grants a person 
the right to a fair trial.197  Third, Jadhav’s right to appeal his sentence 
and conviction has been violated.198 
A. Legality of Detention 
Article 9 of the ICCPR guarantees every individual the right to 
liberty and security, and that no person shall be deprived of his liberty 
by arbitrary detention.199  A legal detention pursuant to Article 9(1) 
requires the detention comply with the procedure established by law.200  
Article 9(2) provides that the detainee must be informed of the reasons 
for his arrest and the charges (if any).201  Article 9(3) safeguards against 
arbitrary detention by obligating States to bring the detention of the 
person under judicial supervision.202  For this, the detainee must 
“promptly” be brought before a judge.203  Finally, Article 9(4) provides 
that any person, even those who have not been detained on criminal 
charges, can question the legitimacy of his detention before a court.204 
Article 9(3) of the ICCPR is particularly relevant in Jadhav’s case.  
Specifically, Article 9(3) prevents prolonged or incommunicado 
detentions.205  If a detainee is kept incommunicado, they are isolated 
                                                          
195.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶¶ 86, 91.  See also International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(both India and Pakistan are State Parties to the ICCPR).  
196.  See Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2. 
197.  Id. 
198.  Application-India, supra note 163, at 24, 26.  
199.  ICCPR, supra note 195, art. 9; see also European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, July 18, 1978, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123. 
200.  ICCPR, supra note 195, art. 9(1).  
201.  Id. art. 9(2). 
202.  Id. art. 9(3). 
203.  Id. 
204.  Id. 
205.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC35, at 11 (Dec. 16, 2014). 
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from the outside world, his family members, consulate, legal counsel, 
etc., so as to prevent any interference in the investigation.206  This form 
of detention can only be permitted for a few days, after which the 
detainee must be brought before a judicial authority.207  For example, a 
detainee’s detention was found to be in violation of Article 9 when he 
was detained for seven days without a warrant or being brought before 
a judge.208  Similarly, the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) found a 
thirty-three-day, warrantless, military detention to be in violation of 
Article 9(3).209  In cases involving terrorist suspects, detentions without 
judicial supervision have been allowed for up to a week only in 
instances when the detainee was given prompt access to legal 
counsel.210  In the oral submissions, India alleged that Jadhav was kept 
incommunicado in military custody, without access to his family 
members, his home State or any legal counsel.211  Pakistan has not 
responded directly to the allegation and maintains that Jadhav was 
provided with legal assistance at the time of the court proceedings.212  
Still unclear, is whether Jadhav was provided with legal assistance 
during his detention (apart from the court proceedings), and if he was 
provided access to medical treatment and other care, both of which can 
only be addressed once the ICJ determines the facts in this case. 
Another relevant issue the Court must examine is the duration 
within which Jadhav’s detention was brought under judicial 
supervision.  The statement issued by Pakistan’s advisor to the Prime 
Minister indicates the first time Jadhav was brought before a Magistrate 
was when Jadhav’s confession was recorded on July 22, 2016—eighty-
two days after his arrest.213 This delay is consistent with the provisions 
                                                          
206.  NIGEL RODLEY & MATT POLLARD, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (3d ed., 2009).  
207.  SARAH JOSEPH & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 374 (3d ed., 
2013). 
208.  U.N. Human Rights Comm, Kurbanov v. Tajikistan, Communication No. 
1096/2002, ¶ 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/D/1096/2002 (2003).  
209.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., Saker v. Algeria, Communication No 
992/2001, ¶ 9.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/992/2001 (2006).  
210.  Brannigan & McBride v. U.K., 258 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) 29, at 50 (1993). 
211.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, at 11.   
212.  Application-India, supra note 163, at 62.  
213.  Id. Annex 4. 
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of Pakistan’s domestic law, which does not provide for prompt judicial 
supervision in case a person is detained under the Pakistan Army Act 
(“PAA”).214  Jadhav could have been arrested either under the Official 
Secrets Act (“OSA”) or under the PAA.215  If his arrest was made under 
the OSA, then under Section 12 of the Act, any member of the armed 
forces would be entitled to arrest a person who has violated the 
provisions of the said Act, without a warrant, and after arrest, the person 
must be brought before a magistrate or a police officer.216  The powers 
of the police officer before whom such a person is brought is then 
supplemented by the PAA.217  The detainee may be transferred by the 
police officer to military custody pursuant to Section 76 of the PAA.218  
Therefore, if Jadhav was arrested under the OSA, the current facts 
indicate that he was remanded to military custody without being 
brought before a Magistrate. 
Conversely, if Jadhav has been arrested under the PAA, then as per 
Section 74, a detainee remains under military custody of the 
commanding officer only.219  The PAA makes no provision for judicial 
supervision of detention.220  Therefore, it is clear, under either law, 
there is a high likelihood that Jadhav’s detention was not appropriately 
reviewed by a judicial entity.  In light of the requirements of both laws 
upon which Jadhav’s arrest and detention are based, India may claim a 
violation of Article 9(3) of the ICCPR.  India can either argue Jadhav’s 
detention in itself was arbitrary because the judicial supervision of the 
detention was not prompt or that there was no judicial supervision at 
all. 
                                                          
214.  Pakistan Army Act, supra note 194, § 74 (Under this Section, the detainee 
can be detained beyond 48 hours by the commanding officer after an application 
explaining the reasons for such delay is submitted to the superior officers). 
215.  See Official Secrets Act, supra note 193, § 12; see also Pakistan Army 
Act, supra note 183, § 74. 
216.  Official Secrets Act, supra note 193, § 12. 
217.  See Pakistan Army Act, supra note 194, § 76. 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. § 74. 
220.  See id.  
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B. Right to a Fair Trial 
Article 14(1) of the ICCPR embodies the right to a fair trial by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.221  
Further, Article 14(3) provides the procedural guarantees that are to be 
accorded to a person during trial.222  These guarantees include the right 
to be tried without undue delay, to engage a counsel of his choosing, to 
cross-examine witnesses, and freedom from compulsion to confess.223 
A military court in Pakistan conducted Jadhav’s trial.224  This fact 
raises the preliminary question as to whether a military court is a 
“competent tribunal” to try civilians under international human rights 
law.  This issue was considered by the HRC in General Comment No. 
32.  The HRC noted that while the Covenant did not expressly prohibit 
civilian trials by military courts or specialized tribunals, there would 
only be justification to do so in exceptional circumstances.225  Recently, 
the HRC expressed its preference for ordinary criminal courts over 
military courts even when dealing with terrorism cases.226  Similarly, 
the IACtHR227 and the African Commission of Human Rights228 have 
                                                          
221.  See ICCPR, supra note 194, art. 14(1).  
222.  Id. art. 14(3).   
223.  Id.  
224.  See Application-India, supra note 163, Annex 4. 
225.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 32, Aug. 23, 2007, ¶ 
22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 [hereinafter General Comment 32]. The ICJ in the 
AhmadouSadio Diallo Case has ascribed great weight to the interpretation adopted by 
Human Rights Committee, as it is an independent body established to interpret the 
ICCPR. It has also taken into account the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights to interpret ICCPR obligation. 
See AhmadouSadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 639, 
¶ 65 (Nov. 30). 
226.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/70/PER (2000) (In the case of Peru, the Human Rights Committee, 
“welcomes with satisfaction the fact that “faceless” courts have been abolished as the 
Committee recommended (CCPR/C/79/Add.67); the fact that the offence of terrorism 
has been transferred from the jurisdiction of the military courts to that of the ordinary 
criminal courts.”). 
227.  Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 52, ¶¶ 127–28 (May 30, 1999) [hereinafter Petruzzi]. 
228.  Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan, Communication No. 222/98 and 
229/99, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 64 (May 29, 2003), 
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placed an absolute prohibition on military courts dealing with civilian 
offenses. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) 
has held that the circumstances surrounding trials of civilians by 
military courts must be exceptional and in accordance with the fair trial 
guarantees.229 
Assuming Pakistan’s military court is competent to try defendants 
accused of terrorism, our analysis must then turn to whether the military 
court is an “independent and impartial” tribunal. In consideration of this 
issue, the Draft Principles governing the Administration of Justice 
through Military Tribunals is particularly instructive.230  These 
principles were formulated by the Special Rapporteur on Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights as a part of her work on “independence of 
judiciary [and] administration of justice” and were subsequently 
adopted by the Commission on Human Rights.231  Draft Principle No. 
13 addresses the right to an independent and impartial tribunal that 
requires the judges of the military tribunals to be independent.232  This 
right requires judges not be under direct subordination of the military. 
Additionally, these principles advise that the presence of civilian judges 
in military tribunals can reinforce the impartiality of such tribunals.233 
The jurisprudence of both the ECHR and the IACtHR yield a 
framework to determine the appropriate composition of a military 
tribunal.  For example, in Findlay v. United Kingdom,234 the ECHR 
scrutinized the British court-martial system.  The Court held that the 
military court was not an independent and impartial tribunal as all 
                                                          
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/33rd/comunications/228.99/achpr33_228_99_en
g.pdf.  
229.  Emmanuel Decaux (Special Rapporteur), Civil and Political Rights, 
Including the Question of Independence of the Judiciary, Administration of Justice, 
Impunity: Issue of the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals, U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/58 (Jan. 
13, 2006) [hereinafter Draft Principles-Military Tribunals]. “Jurisdiction of military 
courts to try civilians: Military courts should, in principle, have no jurisdiction to try 
civilians.  In all circumstances, the State shall ensure that civilians accused of a 
criminal offence of any nature are tried by civilian courts.” Id. 
230.  Id.  
231.  Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
232.  Id. Principle No. 13.  
233.  Id. ¶ 46.  
234.  Findlay v. U.K., App. No. 22107/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 221 (1997). 
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judges reported to the convening officer and were his subordinates.235  
The judgment of the military court, the convening officer, and the judge 
advocate appointed to advise the convening officer on legal issues, were 
not sufficient safeguards in guaranteeing independence.236  Similarly, 
in Palamara Iribarne v. Chile,237 the IACtHR held that the military 
tribunals in Chile lacked independence because they were composed of 
officers who were active military members and, therefore, subordinate 
to higher-ranking officers in the chain of command.238  Additionally, 
their lack of legal education and professional qualifications made them 
incompetent to form an impartial and independent tribunal.239 
In Jadhav’s case, the composition of the military tribunal is similar 
to the aforementioned military courts in the United Kingdom and Chile.  
Section 87 of the Pakistan Army Act of 1952 provides that a Field 
General Court Martial (“FGCM”), the same form of tribunal that tried 
Jadhav, be composed of three or more military officers.240  These 
military officers comprise the State’s executive branch, which falls 
within the military hierarchy and have no prior judicial experience.241  
Additionally, the power to convene an FGCM lies with the Chief of 
Army Staff or an officer above the rank of a brigadier.242  The 
convening officer, in the present case, is the Chief of Army Staff, who 
has the power to confirm the finding and sentence of the FGCM243 as 
well as dissolve the Court martial at his discretion.244  Although the 
members of the Judge Advocate branch can provide legal services and 
supervise the operation of military courts, they do not have the power 
to sit on the bench to hear the cases.245  In light of this, India’s argument 
                                                          
235.  Id. 
236.  Id.; see also Yalgin & Others v. Turk., App. No. 31892/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶ 37 (2001), http://www.hri.ca/ fortherecord2001/euro2001/documentation/ 
judgments/applno31892-96.htm. 
237.  Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 135, ¶¶ 124, 139, 269 (2005).  
238.  Id.  
239.  Id.  
240.  Pakistan Army Act, supra note 194, § 87.  
241.  Id. § 2.  
242.  Id. § 84.  
243.  Id. § 123.  
244.  Id. § 89(3).  
245.  Id. § 103.  
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that Jadhav was tried before a “kangaroo”246 court seems plausible.  If 
India is correct, the Court may find a violation of Article 14 of the 
ICCPR on this ground. 
The next detail of Jadhav’s trial requiring attention is his right to 
legal counsel of his own choosing.  Article 14(3)(b) and (d) guarantee 
a person the right to communicate and retain counsel of his choosing.  
While this right is not absolute and can be restricted where the accused 
is facing charges of terrorism, it is essential that the accused is provided 
some legal assistance in order to be able to defend himself efficiently.247  
In the oral submissions, India argued that Jadhav has been kept and is 
still currently being held incommunicado, which raises the issue of 
whether he was ever provided legal assistance.248  In response, Pakistan 
asserts that he was afforded all fair trial guarantees, including a 
qualified legal officer throughout the proceedings.249 However, it must 
be noted that the  PAA, under which Jadhav has been tried and 
convicted, does not provide for the right to legal assistance to the 
accused.250  This fact contradicts Section 340 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1898, which requires the State to provide and bear the 
expense of legal assistance for the accused.  The determination of 
whether Jadhav’s right was violated would ultimately depend on facts 
presented before the ICJ during the merits stage.  However, concerns 
have been consistently raised regarding Pakistan’s denial of legal 
counsel to defendants tried in a military court.251  Therefore, it is 
possible that there is merit in India’s argument. 
Finally, India alleged Jadhav’s confessional video was taken in 
captivity, where he was coerced and forced to testify against his will.252  
Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR protects the accused from being 
compelled to testify or confess against their will.253  This procedural 
safeguard was included in Article 14 to ensure that the investigating 
                                                          
246.  Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, ¶ 14.  
247.  General Comment 32, supra note 225, ¶ 37.  
248.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶¶ 91, 93.  
249.  Application-India, supra note 163, ¶ 17(d).  
250.  Id. ¶¶ 51–52. 
251. Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Military Injustice in Pakistan: A Briefing Paper 
8, 21 (June 2016), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Pakistan-
Military-court-Advocacy-Analysis-brief-2016-ENG.pdf.  
252.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶ 71.  
253.  ICCPR, supra note 195, art. 14(3)(g).  
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authorities do not put undue physical or mental pressure to obtain a 
confession of guilt.254  Additionally, the burden of proof is on the State 
to prove that the statements have been made voluntarily and of the 
accused’s free will.255  In Jadhav’s case, Pakistan has the burden to 
prove the confessional video was taken of Jadhav’s free will and in the 
presence of legal assistance.  It is quite peculiar that, in Pakistan, at least 
135 out of 144 people convicted by military courts have confessed to 
their involvement in terrorist activities during their trials.256  
Considering the rate of confessions is almost 94%, doubts have been 
raised as to the voluntariness of these confessions and the treatment of 
the convicts in military custody.257  This fact lends support to India’s 
claim that fair trial guarantees of Jadhav as per the ICCPR have been 
violated. 
C. Right to Appeal 
Article 14(5) of the ICCPR states that any person convicted of a 
crime shall have the right to have his conviction and sentence reviewed 
by a higher tribunal.258  The right to appeal is available to all those who 
have been convicted, including persons tried by military courts.259  In 
fact, Principle No. 17 of the Draft Principles governing the 
Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals states that appeals 
from decisions of military courts must be brought before civil courts.260  
In Jadhav’s case, an appeal from the Pakistan’s FGCM was later 
confirmed by the Court of Appeals established under the martial law 
                                                          
254.  General Comment 32, supra note 225, ¶ 41. 
255.  Human Rights Comm., Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, Communication No. 
1033/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1033/2001, ¶ 7.4 (2004).  
256. Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Military Injustice in Pakistan: Questions and 
Answers, at 2 (Dec. 2016) https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Pakistan-
military-courts-QA-Advocacy-2016-ENG.pdf. 
257.  Id. 
258.  ICCPR, supra note 195, at 177,  
259. Gabriela Knaul (Special Rapporteur), Human Rights Council, 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, U.N. Doc. A/68/285, ¶ 82 (Aug. 2013). 
260.  Draft Principles-Military Tribunals, supra note 229, at 21.  
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system itself.261  In fact, no civil court can exercise jurisdiction 
(appellate or otherwise) over matters falling under the Pakistan Army 
Act.262  Thus, the bar on civil courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction 
itself is in some ways a prima facie violation of Jadhav’s right to appeal. 
The due process of an appeal must be substantially similar to the 
due process guarantees provided in a trial: an independent and impartial 
tribunal, adequate facilities for the preparation of the appeal, and the 
right to represent one’s defense through a legal counsel.263  In oral 
submissions, India argued the appellate proceedings before a military 
tribunal are illusory because the officers convening the tribunal are 
subordinate to the Chief of Army Staff, who has already confirmed 
Jadhav’s death sentence.264  Under Section 133B of the Pakistan Army 
Act, 1952, the Court of Appeals shall consist of the Chief of Army Staff 
or an officer above the rank of a brigadier that has been appointed by 
him.265  The implication of this section is that the officers that are part 
of the Court of Appeals are subject to the military chain of command.  
It is difficult to imagine a scenario where an officer designated by the 
Chief of Army Staff would reverse a sentence that has been confirmed 
by the latter.  Similarly, in Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, the IACtHR ruled 
an appeal before a tribunal that is a component of the military structure 
violates the independence and impartiality of the tribunal itself.266 
India also argued that Pakistan has not provided Jadhav or India 
with copies of the charge sheet, proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, the 
summary of evidence, or the judgment convicting him.267  This fact 
strengthens India’s argument that Jadhav has not been given adequate 
facilities to prepare his defense, one of the due process guarantees under 
Article 14(3)(b).  The HRC has held that the right to appeal can only be 
exercised effectively if the convicted person has access to a duly 
reasoned judgment, trial transcripts, and other documents to prepare his 
                                                          
261.  Pak Army Chief Analyzing Jadhav’s Plea, Decision on Merit, THE HINDU 
BUS. LINE (July 16, 2017), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/pak-army-
chief-analysing-jadhavs-plea-decision-on-merit/article9770932.ece. 
262.  Pakistan Army Act, supra note 194, § 133B.  
263.  General Comment 32, supra note 225, ¶ 91. 
264.  Application-India, supra note 163, at 26–27.  
265.  Pakistan Army Act, supra note 194, § 133B.  
266.  Petruzzi, supra note 227, ¶ 161.   
267.  Oral Submissions-India, supra note 2, ¶ 83.  
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defense.268  It follows that if Pakistan has indeed denied access to all 
these documents, its conduct will violate Jadhav’s right to appeal under 
the ICCPR. 
Finally, India has argued that Jadhav will have no legal assistance 
at the appellate stage, rendering his right to appeal nugatory.  India has 
relied on the news reports of the Lahore High Court Bar Association’s 
threats to cancel the membership of lawyers who represent Jadhav at 
the appellate stage before the military courts.269  Under Pakistan’s 
domestic law, it is bound to provide legal assistance at the expense of 
the State as under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898.270  Therefore, to prove a violation of the right to counsel for the 
appellate process India must prove that the ICJ requirement of adequate 
legal representation was not granted to Jadhav even at the appellate 
stage. 
VII. THE ISSUE OF REMEDIES 
Under general principles of law, every State that commits a 
wrongful act must make reparations for it.271  In the Chorzow Factory 
Case, the PCIJ held that restitution or re-establishment of the situation 
that existed prior to committing the wrongful act is a primary remedy 
in international law.272  In its Application and oral submissions, India 
requested four separate remedial measures: (1) a declaration that the 
military court’s decision violated Article 36 of the VCCR and Article 
14 of the ICCPR; (2) an annulment of the military court’s decision; (3) 
a declaration that the military court’s decision was illegal; and (4) an 
order for the release of Jadhav.273  At a minimum, India requests the 
Court annul the decision of Pakistan’s military court and subsequently 
order Jadhav’s release.274  In response to this, Pakistan has relied on 
                                                          
268.  General Comment 32, supra note 225, ¶ 49.  
269.  Application-India, supra note 163, at 28–29.  
270.  PAK. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 340 (Pak.). 
271.  Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
2001(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/56/49/Corr.4 (2001) [hereinafter 
State Responsibility Articles].  
272.  Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13 at 47 (Sept. 13).  
273.  Application-India, supra note 163, at 33. 
274.  Id. at 31. 
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Breard, LaGrand, and Avena to argue that the reliefs sought by India 
are “manifestly unavailable.”275  The juxtaposing positions raise 
questions of the appropriate remedy in cases concerning violations of 
VCCR and ICCPR, as well as the authority of the Court to grant such 
remedies. 
In Breard, LaGrand, and Avena, the ICJ addressed the remedies 
that can be granted in response to an Article 36 violation.276  In Breard, 
Paraguay argued that an Article 36 violation entitled it to a remedy of 
restitution by absolving Mr. Breard of all criminal liability.277  Paraguay 
also requested the United States conduct a whole new proceeding 
compliant with the VCCR.278 Because the case was withdrawn before 
the merits phase, the ICJ was not able to decide on the issue of what 
remedies were available to Paraguay.279 
The ICJ, in the 2001 LaGrand decision, held an Article 36 violation 
during the adjudication of a case involving death penalty would require 
the United States to effectively, “review and reconsider” the 
convictions taking into account the VCCR violation, using a means of 
its own choosing.280  In Avena, the ICJ clarified how “review and 
reconsideration of convictions” function as a remedial measure.281  The 
ICJ held that the appropriate remedy required the United States to 
review the convictions and ascertain whether the conviction was 
prejudiced by the violation of Article 36.282  Further, the ICJ denied 
Mexico’s request to annul the convictions and noted the convictions and 
sentences were not in violation of international law.283  However, this 
was likely due in part because only the detention of the detainees was 
in violation of Article 36, while the subsequent trial and the convictions 
were consistent with international law.284 
                                                          
275.  See Oral Submissions-Pakistan, supra note 3, at 16.  
276.  Breard, supra note 10, ¶¶ 30–37; LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8, ¶ 125; 
Avena-Judgment, supra note 67, ¶ 121. 
277.  Breard, supra note 10, ¶ 5, § 4 1-3. 
278.  Id. ¶ 30.  
279.  Id. ¶ 40  
280.  LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8, ¶ 125.  
281.  Avena-Judgment, supra note 67, ¶ 122. 
282.  Id. ¶ 134. 
283.  Id. ¶ 152. 
284.  Id. ¶ 128–29.  
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An analysis of the preceding decisions might support Pakistan’s 
contention that the remedial measures sought by India are ones that the 
ICJ has not granted in its practice.  In the event the ICJ finds India’s 
argument meritorious, it appears the only remedial measure available 
to India is the review and reconsideration of the sentence of Jadhav, 
provided by means of Pakistan’s “own choosing.”  The review and 
reconsideration must be judicial, and an executive review by way of a 
clemency proceeding is not permitted.285  The ICJ clarified this 
requirement in Avena, holding, a review and reconsideration must 
analyze the effect the Article 36(1) breach had on the detainee’s 
conviction and sentence.286  Such a review is possible only through a 
judicial system.287 
It is instructive after analysis of Pakistan’s argument, to consider 
the disparity in the facts in Jadhav’s case and the facts relevant to the 
three cases mentioned above.  In all three cases, Paraguay, Germany, 
and Mexico merely alleged a violation of the VCCR and did not dispute 
the legality of the conviction, sentence or the judicial proceedings.288  
Accordingly, the Court held that a violation of Article 36 did not 
automatically trigger an annulment of the convictions.289  Conversely, 
India alleges not just an Article 36 violation, but argues the 
circumstances of Jadhav’s detention, trial, and adjudication before the 
military court violate the ICCPR and international law generally.290  
Thus, it is a viable possibility that the ICJ may find that India is entitled 
to the remedies sought.  However, India’s success rests on its ability to 
establish both that the remedial measure sought is appropriate, and that 
the ICJ possesses the authority to grant such measures. 
An appropriate remedy for a violation of a human right is restitution 
or restoration of those human rights.291  In the event a trial is found to 
                                                          
285.  Id. ¶ 141. 
286.  Id. ¶ 138. 
287.  Id. ¶ 141. 
288.  See Breard, supra note 10; LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8; Avena-
Judgment, supra note 67.  
289.  Avena-Judgment, supra note 67, ¶ 129. 
290.  Application-India, supra note 163, ¶ 2.  
291.  G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, ¶ 19 (Mar. 21, 
2006). 
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be unfair and in violation of due process, a retrial following the 
annulment of the previous adjudication is appropriate.292  This remedial 
measure represents a form of legal restitution.293  In the event a detainee 
was found to have been arbitrarily or unlawfully detained, the 
appropriate remedial measure is release to restore the personal liberty 
of the individual.294  It follows, that in a situation where the detention 
is legal and only the subsequent trial is unfair, the remedy is a retrial by 
annulling the previous judicial act, and not the release of the 
individual.295  To secure Jadhav’s release, India will not only need to 
prove that the trial before the military court was in violation of Article 
14 of the ICCPR, but it will also need to establish that the detention 
itself was unlawful and arbitrary (judged by the standards of Article 9, 
as argued above). 
The second hurdle India must overcome in obtaining relief for 
Jadhav is establishing the ICJ’s authority to grant a remedial order that 
directs a State to act in a particular manner.  The issue of the ICJ’s 
authority in this realm has been the subject of debate for years.296  The 
Court’s Statute does not provide any guidance on its remedial authority 
or the existence and scope of limits to this authority.297  This issue is 
                                                          
292. See Vladimir Romanov v. Russ., App. No. 41461/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 
24, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“appno”:[“41461/02”],”itemid”:[“001-
87836”]}; Salduz v. Turk., App. No. 36391/02, 49 Eur. H. R. Rep. 19 (2008); 
FOLLESDAL ET AL., CONSTITUTING EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN A NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT 157 (2013). 
293.  State Responsibility Articles, supra note 271, at 97 (Legal restitution 
denotes the alteration or revocation of a legal measure taken in violation of 
international law, whether a judicial decision or an act of legislation or even a 
constitutional provision.). 
294.  Assanidze v. Geor., 2004-II Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 203 [hereinafter Assanidze]; 
Ilaşcu and Others v. Russ. and Mold., App. No 48787/99, 40 Eur. H. R. Rep. 1030 
(2005); Human Rights Comm., Sarma v. Sri Lanka, Communication No. 950/2000, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000 ¶ 11 (2003); Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Merits, 
Reparation and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33, ¶ 3 (Sept. 17, 
1997) [hereinafter Loayza Tamayo].  
295.  Petruzzi, supra note 227, ¶ 221.  
296.  See FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 563 
(Vaughan Lowe et. al. eds., 1996); CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 209 (2007); CHRISTINE GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (1990). 
297.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 (June 
26, 1945). 
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clear in cases that come before the Court through a special agreement 
or a compromis where the parties may specify remedial measures the 
Court can grant.  However, the same clarity is not available in a case 
brought before the ICJ under the compulsory clauses of Article 36(1).298  
An analysis of the ICJ’s jurisprudence indicates a history of caution in 
granting mandatory orders.299  For example, in the Asylum Case 
between Peru and Colombia, the parties requested that the ICJ decide 
the means of implementation of its judgment. The ICJ denied the 
request finding that the authority to make such a determination was not 
within its judicial function.300 
Subsequently, however, the ICJ has been more assertive in granting 
mandatory orders for legal restitution.  For example, the Court has 
ordered the return of cultural objects to Cambodia in the Temple of 
Preah Vihear Case,301 and the cessation of the construction of a wall in 
the Legality of Construction of Wall Opinion.302  In the context of the 
Jadhav dispute, the remedial measures granted by the Court in the 
Tehran Hostages Case,303 the Arrest Warrant Case,304 and the 
Jurisdictional Immunities Case305 are particularly relevant.  In the 
Tehran Hostages Case, the ICJ ordered Iran to release the detainees.306 
Moreover, the ICJ has issued orders for legal restitution in both the 
Arrest Warrant Case and Jurisdictional Immunities Case.307  In the 
Arrest Warrant Case, the ICJ ordered Belgium to cancel the arrest 
                                                          
298.  GRAY, supra note 296, at 64.  
299.  Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20). 
300.  Id.  
301.  Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 
Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15).  
302.  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) (This approach of 
the ICJ is also in line with the jurisprudence of other international tribunals such as 
the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter American Court of Human Rights 
that have adopted a robust view of their remedial jurisdiction and granted mandatory 
orders.). See Loayza Tamayo, supra note 294; Assanidze, supra note 294.  
303.  Tehran Hostages, supra note 138.  
304.  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of 
Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant].   
305.  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
99 (Feb. 3) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Immunities].  
306.  Tehran Hostages, supra note 138.   
307.  Arrest Warrant, supra note 304.   
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warrant as it was in violation of the immunities of the Foreign Minister 
of Congo.308  Similarly, in the Jurisdictional Immunities Case, Italy was 
ordered to annul its domestic judicial decisions that infringed the 
sovereign immunities of Germany.309 
However, the ICJ’s willingness to assume jurisdiction and grant 
mandatory orders in the recent past does not indicate the Court will 
abandon its previous approach of allowing States to choose the means 
of implementation of its judgment.310  The commitment to its original 
restraint is evidenced by the ICJ’s willingness to allow parties to 
implement its mandatory orders by “means of [the State’s] own 
choosing.”311  This approach is indicative of the interests the ICJ must 
balance.  Specifically, the ICJ must protect its authority to grant 
appropriate and effective remedies for violations of international law, 
while at the same time, respecting the State’s sovereignty in exercising 
discretion to determine the manner in which to follow the Court’s 
orders. 
Should Pakistan object to a remedial annulment of the conviction 
or an order to release Jadhav, the foundation of this objection will likely 
be rooted in the assertion that such an order represents an interference 
by the ICJ in Pakistan’s domestic judicial system.  The ICJ addressed 
this argument in Breard and LaGrand.  The ICJ found that violations 
of the VCCR, which require an analysis of the domestic proceedings, 
are not proper because the ICJ is not a court of appeal, but rather a court 
that assesses a State’s conduct vis-a-vis the rules of international law.312  
Accordingly, the ICJ’s powers are limited, and it cannot perform other 
functions of an appellate court such as review evidence submitted at the 
trial or hear arguments of the accused.  However, Pakistan’s argument 
does not prevent the ICJ from issuing an order in the event the ICJ finds 
it possesses authority to grant India the relief sought. 
                                                          
308.  Id.  
309.  Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 305.   
310.  See, e.g., LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8; Avena-Judgment, supra note 
67; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 305; Arrest Warrant, supra note 304. 
311.  See, e.g., LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8; Avena-Judgment, supra note 
67; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 305; Arrest Warrant, supra note 304.  
312.  LaGrand-Judgment, supra note 8, ¶ 52; Breard, supra note 10, ¶ 38.  
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CONCLUSION 
This Article attempts an exhaustive analysis of all possible 
questions that the Jadhav dispute raises; however, how many of these 
issues the ICJ touches upon in its final decision remains to be seen.  
Traditionally, the ICJ’s approach has been narrow and restricted to an 
analysis of only the issues that are absolutely necessary for arriving at 
its decision.  As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the 
ICJ understands that its holdings can have a significant effect on the 
evolution of international law and more often than not, adopts a rather 
circumspect approach to deciding a dispute.  It also remains to be seen, 
whether, as a matter of legal strategy, either party raises new arguments 
or concomitantly, drops some of the contentions raised at the 
provisional measures hearing.  In fact, Pakistan has indicated that it will 
change its legal team for the merits phase of the dispute.313  Whether, 
and to what extent, such change will result in a shift legal strategy or in 
the kind of arguments it raises at the merits phase, will likely prove to 
be interesting.  The shift in legal strategy appears necessary due to the 
possibility that many of Pakistan’s submissions on the merits lack 
significant legal backing and are not likely to find favor with the Court.  
However, based on both parties’ oral submissions and the inferences 
that can be made from them, India has a strong case on the merits. 
Irrespective of which way the Court ultimately decides, Jadhav’s case 
raises a plethora of interesting international law issues, all of which are 
likely to pique the interest of international law enthusiasts. 
 
                                                          
313.  See Dev Goswami, After ICJ ruling in India’s favour, Pakistan to change 
legal team in Kulbhushan Jadhav case, INDIA TODAY (May 19, 2017), 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pakistan-to-change-legal-team-in-kulbhushan-
jadhav-case/1/957618.html. 
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